[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fNb3AC-V0LItWbjANFw07y2UeJ1ah2u7UpA-7HhIPb_0":3,"$fBfQo46z49CVCg81EcUsHPdw-nJyWiZ33fkMf8Vv211A":67},{"article":4},{"slug":5,"title":6,"subtitle":7,"summary":8,"tags":9,"body_md":15,"hero_image_url":16,"structured":17,"story_type":64,"created_at":65,"updated_at":66,"published_at":39},"nightmare-eclipse-releases-shieldbreak-windows-lpe-poc-for-cve-2026-62832","Nightmare-Eclipse releases ShieldBreak Windows LPE PoC for CVE-2026-62832","New PoC drops a DLL into System32 via wermgr.exe and runs as SYSTEM after August 2026 Patch Tuesday.","The Nightmare-Eclipse actor published ShieldBreak, its tenth Windows LPE PoC, which abuses Cloud Files, Object Manager namespace, Defender API, and a remediation timing race to load a DLL from System32 and execute as SYSTEM.",[10,11,12,13,14],"Windows","LPE","CVE-2026-62832","Nightmare-Eclipse","PoC","# Nightmare-Eclipse releases ShieldBreak Windows LPE PoC for CVE-2026-62832\n\n*New PoC drops a DLL into System32 via wermgr.exe and runs as SYSTEM after August 2026 Patch Tuesday.*\n\n**Tags:** `Windows` `LPE` `CVE-2026-62832` `Nightmare-Eclipse` `PoC`\n\n> The Nightmare-Eclipse actor published ShieldBreak, its tenth Windows LPE PoC, which abuses Cloud Files, Object Manager namespace, Defender API, and a remediation timing race to load a DLL from System32 and execute as SYSTEM.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n| CVE | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | PoC | PRS risk |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| CVE-2026-62832 | 7.8 | 3.3% | — | — | 45.7 (Medium) |\n\n## ShieldBreak: The 10th Windows LPE from Nightmare-Eclipse\n\nShieldBreak is the tenth proof-of-concept in the Nightmare-Eclipse series, following BlueHammer, RedSun, UnDefend, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, MiniPlasma, GreatXML, RoguePlanet, and LegacyHive. The actor released it shortly after Microsoft’s August 2026 Patch Tuesday, which patches CVE-2026-62832 in the Windows User Profile Service.\n\nThe vulnerability is an improper link resolution before file access in the User Profile Service, allowing an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. It carries a CVSS 7.8 score and an EPSS of 3.3% (88th percentile). No KEV listing or public PoC was known at release time.\n\nThe exploit drops a DLL into System32 and loads it via wermgr.exe, which runs as SYSTEM. A SYSTEM-integrity process then connects to a user-created named pipe, completing the local privilege escalation without an interactive admin prompt.\n\n## The Four-Stage Exploit Chain\n\nThe exploit chain executes in four stages. Stage 1 performs an Object Manager namespace hijack by calling NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject followed by NtCreateDirectoryObjectEx from user mode, allowing the attacker to intercept object paths before the target resolves them.\n\nStage 2 hijacks the Cloud Files API by calling CfRegisterSyncRoot from a non-cloud-sync process, registering the attacker’s sync root to intercept file operations. This is the same technique shared with LegacyHive.\n\nStage 3 triggers Windows Defender remediation via a direct API call, forcing Defender to process the file and execute the remediation path that loads the planted DLL.\n\nStage 4 is a timing race: the attacker drops phoneinfo.dll into System32 and triggers wermgr.exe to load it before the race window closes. wermgr.exe runs as SYSTEM, so the DLL executes at SYSTEM integrity. A SYSTEM-integrity process then connects to the user-created named pipe, completing the local privilege escalation without an interactive admin prompt.\n\n## How the DLL Gets Loaded as SYSTEM\n\nThe final stage of the chain relies on Windows Error Reporting to load the planted DLL at SYSTEM integrity. wermgr.exe, a trusted system binary, loads phoneinfo.dll from the System32 directory, a pattern that generates a Sysmon EID 7 event with near-zero false positives. The DLL executes at SYSTEM integrity because wermgr.exe runs as SYSTEM, giving the attacker a high-integrity context to complete the privilege escalation.\n\nOnce the DLL is loaded, a SYSTEM-integrity process connects to the user-created SHIELDBREAK named pipe, which was created in an earlier stage. This connection is captured by Sysmon EID 18 and completes the local privilege escalation without an interactive admin prompt. The entire flow moves a standard user to SYSTEM in a single pass, which is the same pattern used across all ten Nightmare-Eclipse LPE tools.\n\nThe QueueReporting scheduled task is triggered via ITaskService::Run(), generating Security EID 4698 and 4702 events. This is the standard mechanism Nightmare-Eclipse uses to kick off the exploit from user context, and it avoids the UAC prompt that would otherwise appear for an interactive admin.\n\n## Detection and Hunting\n\nLevelBlue published a YARA rule, `ShieldBreak_WD_Pipeline_LPE_PoC`, marked TLP WHITE, that matches the binary by its NT Object Manager strings. The rule anchors on `NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject` and `NtCreateDirectoryObjectEx` as ASCII or wide strings, the same fingerprint shared with LegacyHive.\n\nFor runtime detection, Sysmon EID 17 catches the hardcoded named pipe name. The PoC creates a pipe with a fixed name, so you can filter on the pipe name string in the CreateProcess event. EID 7 is the high-signal event: it fires when `wermgr.exe` loads `phoneinfo.dll` from System32, and it has near-zero false positives because the DLL name and path are specific to this PoC. EID 18 captures the SYSTEM process connecting to the user-created named pipe, which is the final step that completes the privilege escalation.\n\n## Key points\n\n- ShieldBreak is the tenth release in the Nightmare-Eclipse series, following BlueHammer, RedSun, UnDefend, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, MiniPlasma, GreatXML, RoguePlanet, and LegacyHive.\n- The PoC abuses Cloud Files, Object Manager namespace, Defender API, and a remediation timing race to drop a DLL into System32 and run as SYSTEM.\n- wermgr.exe loads phoneinfo.dll from System32, and a SYSTEM-integrity process connects to the SHIELDBREAK named pipe.\n- CVE-2026-62832 is a Windows User Profile Service LPE with CVSS 7.8, EPSS 3.3% (88th pct), and PRS risk 45.7 (Medium).\n- No CVE was assigned and no patch was available at time of writing; updated Defender signatures appear sufficient to block the exploit in its current public state.\n\n## Further reading & sources\n\n- [Cloud Sync Root RegistrationShieldBreak: Hunting Windows Defender Remediation Abuse and Cloud Files Hijacking](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.levelblue.com\u002Fblogs\u002Fspiderlabs-blog\u002Fcloud-sync-root-registrationshieldbreak-hunting-windows-defender-remediation-abuse-and-cloud-files-hijacking) — LevelBlue SpiderLabs Blog\n- [August 2026 Patch Tuesday: Updates and Analysis | CrowdStrike](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.crowdstrike.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fblog\u002Fpatch-tuesday-analysis-august-2026)","https:\u002F\u002Fapi.precursorintelligence.com\u002Fstorage\u002Fv1\u002Fobject\u002Fpublic\u002Fnews-heroes\u002Fnightmare-eclipse-releases-shieldbreak-windows-lpe-poc-for-cve-2026-62832.png?v=ad2aa48da3",{"cves":18,"iocs":27,"malware":31,"targets":34,"timeline":40,"industries":45,"techniques":50,"technologies":55},[19],{"id":12,"kev":20,"poc":20,"url":21,"cvss":22,"epss":23,"risk_band":24,"risk_score":25,"cvss_version":26},false,"\u002Fvulnerabilities\u002FCVE-2026-62832",7.8,0.0037,"Medium",45.42,"3.1",[28],{"type":29,"value":30},"other","wermgr.exe",[32],{"name":33},"ShieldBreak",[35],{"name":36,"sector":37,"status":38,"geography":39},"Microsoft","Software","confirmed",null,[41],{"date":42,"event":43,"description":44},"2026-08-19","Disclosure","ShieldBreak PoC published",[46],{"url":47,"name":48,"slug":49},"\u002Findustries\u002Ftechnology","Technology","technology",[51],{"id":52,"url":53,"name":54},"T1053.005","\u002Fmitre-attack\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1053.005","Scheduled Task",[56,58,60,62],{"vendor":36,"product":57},"Cloud Files API",{"vendor":36,"product":59},"NT Object Manager",{"vendor":36,"product":61},"Windows Error Reporting",{"vendor":36,"product":63},"Windows Defender","threat_actor_activity","2026-09-18T12:04:47.546492+00:00","2026-10-16T12:28:32.057439+00:00",{"articles":68},[69,76,88,101],{"slug":70,"title":71,"summary":72,"tags":73,"hero_image_url":74,"story_type":64,"created_at":75},"nightmare-eclipse-discloses-legacyhive-windows-lpe-poc","Nightmare-Eclipse Discloses LegacyHive Windows LPE PoC","The Nightmare-Eclipse persona has released LegacyHive, a local privilege escalation PoC for Windows User Profile Service that abuses offline registry manipulation, following the July 2026 Patch Tuesday.",[10,11,14,12,13],"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.precursorintelligence.com\u002Fstorage\u002Fv1\u002Fobject\u002Fpublic\u002Fnews-heroes\u002Fnightmare-eclipse-discloses-legacyhive-windows-lpe-poc.png?v=094f333761","2026-08-28T07:20:29.116004+00:00",{"slug":77,"title":78,"summary":79,"tags":80,"hero_image_url":85,"story_type":86,"created_at":87},"sophos-mdr-accelerates-netntlmv1-rainbow-table-lookups-without-gpus","Sophos MDR Accelerates NetNTLMv1 Rainbow Table Lookups Without GPUs","Sophos MDR research shows that NetNTLMv1 rainbow table lookups can be accelerated without GPU acceleration, reducing the cost and complexity of exploiting the legacy protocol in modern Windows environments.",[81,82,83,10,84],"NetNTLMv1","Rainbow Table","Sophos MDR","Credential Attack","https:\u002F\u002Fapi.precursorintelligence.com\u002Fstorage\u002Fv1\u002Fobject\u002Fpublic\u002Fnews-heroes\u002Fsophos-mdr-accelerates-netntlmv1-rainbow-table-lookups-without-gpus.png?v=4ba5ea1c64","vulnerability_disclosure","2026-09-13T07:05:38.508154+00:00",{"slug":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"tags":92,"hero_image_url":99,"story_type":64,"created_at":100},"russian-state-actors-exploit-exposed-ip-cameras-to-track-nato-troop-movements-in","Russian State Actors Exploit Exposed IP Cameras to Track NATO Troop Movements in Ukraine","The Netherlands' AIVD and MIVD released a joint advisory warning that Russian state actors are systematically exploiting publicly exposed IP cameras to track NATO troop and supply movements in the ongoing Ukraine war.",[93,94,95,96,97,98],"Russia","IP Camera","NATO","Ukraine","AIVD","MIVD","https:\u002F\u002Fapi.precursorintelligence.com\u002Fstorage\u002Fv1\u002Fobject\u002Fpublic\u002Fnews-heroes\u002Frussian-state-actors-exploit-exposed-ip-cameras-to-track-nato-troop-movements-in.png?v=74b95987f5","2026-09-30T07:07:04.966623+00:00",{"slug":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"tags":105,"hero_image_url":112,"story_type":64,"created_at":113},"fancy-bear-ai-enabled-attacks-surge-89-in-crowdstrike-2026-report","Fancy Bear AI-Enabled Attacks Surge 89% in CrowdStrike 2026 Report","CrowdStrike's 2026 Global Threat Report shows Fancy Bear (APT28) AI-enabled adversary activity up 89% year-over-year, eCrime average breakout time at 29 minutes, and GenAI prompt injection confirmed at 90+ organizations.",[106,107,108,109,110,111],"Fancy Bear","APT28","CrowdStrike","LLM malware","GenAI prompt injection","eCrime","https:\u002F\u002Fapi.precursorintelligence.com\u002Fstorage\u002Fv1\u002Fobject\u002Fpublic\u002Fnews-heroes\u002Ffancy-bear-ai-enabled-attacks-surge-89-in-crowdstrike-2026-report.png?v=f7ed8c119c","2026-09-29T12:06:38.382267+00:00"]