[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$foZW3qQY5J2yzWbUqS-iFCi90NSVHCH2jNEldxYF54js":3},{"success":4,"data":5},true,{"vendor":6,"topVulnerabilitiesByEpss":32,"kevVulnerabilities":93,"topProductsByCves":94,"seoMetadata":98,"meta":107},{"vendorId":7,"vendorName":8,"productCount":9,"cveCount":10,"kevCount":11,"versionCount":12,"lastCveUpdate":13,"firstLetter":14,"products":15,"description":31},20186,"mobyproject",3,27,0,349,"2025-07-30","m",[16,21,27],{"id":17,"product_name":18,"version_count":19,"cve_count":20,"kev_count":11,"last_cve_update":13},113429,"moby",250,17,{"id":22,"product_name":23,"version_count":24,"cve_count":25,"kev_count":11,"last_cve_update":26},113427,"buildkit",82,5,"2024-01-31",{"id":28,"product_name":29,"version_count":20,"cve_count":25,"kev_count":11,"last_cve_update":30},113428,"hyperkit","2023-02-20","Mobyproject is a technology vendor with 3 tracked products and 27 known security vulnerabilities. Get comprehensive security analysis, vulnerability tracking, and threat intelligence for this vendor.",[33,41,48,55,60,67,72,77,82,87],{"cveId":34,"description":35,"publishedDate":26,"cvssScore":36,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":38,"isKev":39,"epssScore":40},"CVE-2024-23653","BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. In addition to running containers as build steps, BuildKit also provides APIs for running interactive containers based on built images. It was possible to use these APIs to ask BuildKit to run a container with elevated privileges. Normally, running such containers is only allowed if special `security.insecure` entitlement is enabled both by buildkitd configuration and allowed by the user initializing the build request. The issue has been fixed in v0.12.5 . Avoid using BuildKit frontends from untrusted sources. \n",9.8,"v3.1","Critical",false,0.03446,{"cveId":42,"description":43,"publishedDate":44,"cvssScore":45,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":47},"CVE-2021-41091","Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where the data directory (typically `\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fdocker`) contained subdirectories with insufficiently restricted permissions, allowing otherwise unprivileged Linux users to traverse directory contents and execute programs. When containers included executable programs with extended permission bits (such as `setuid`), unprivileged Linux users could discover and execute those programs. When the UID of an unprivileged Linux user on the host collided with the file owner or group inside a container, the unprivileged Linux user on the host could discover, read, and modify those files. This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade limit access to the host to trusted users. Limit access to host volumes to trusted containers.","2021-10-04",6.3,"Medium",0.02848,{"cveId":49,"description":50,"publishedDate":51,"cvssScore":52,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":53,"isKev":39,"epssScore":54},"CVE-2023-28840","Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects\u002Fproducts. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby\u002Fmoby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*.\n\nSwarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.\n\nThe overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation\u002Fuser of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.\n\nEncrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.\n\nWhen setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.\n\nTwo iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.\n\nThe injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.\n\nPatches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.\n\nSome workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and\u002For ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.","2023-04-04",8.7,"High",0.02559,{"cveId":56,"description":57,"publishedDate":26,"cvssScore":58,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":38,"isKev":39,"epssScore":59},"CVE-2024-23652","BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. A malicious BuildKit frontend or Dockerfile using RUN --mount could trick the feature that removes empty files created for the mountpoints into removing a file outside the container, from the host system. The issue has been fixed in v0.12.5. Workarounds include avoiding using BuildKit frontends from an untrusted source or building an untrusted Dockerfile containing RUN --mount feature.",10,0.02464,{"cveId":61,"description":62,"publishedDate":63,"cvssScore":64,"cvssVersion":65,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":66},"CVE-2017-16539","The DefaultLinuxSpec function in oci\u002Fdefaults.go in Docker Moby through 17.03.2-ce does not block \u002Fproc\u002Fscsi pathnames, which allows attackers to trigger data loss (when certain older Linux kernels are used) by leveraging Docker container access to write a \"scsi remove-single-device\" line to \u002Fproc\u002Fscsi\u002Fscsi, aka SCSI MICDROP.","2017-11-04",5.9,"v3.0",0.01829,{"cveId":68,"description":69,"publishedDate":51,"cvssScore":70,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":71},"CVE-2023-28842","Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects\u002Fproducts. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby\u002Fmoby is commonly referred to as *Docker*.\n\nSwarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.\n\nThe `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation\u002Fuser of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.\n\nEncrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.\n\nWhen setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.\n\nThe `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate.\n\nEncrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration.\n\nPatches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.\n\nSome workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.",6.8,0.0144,{"cveId":73,"description":74,"publishedDate":26,"cvssScore":75,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":76},"CVE-2024-23650","BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. A malicious BuildKit client or frontend could craft a request that could lead to BuildKit daemon crashing with a panic. The issue has been fixed in v0.12.5. As a workaround, avoid using BuildKit frontends from untrusted sources.\n",5.3,0.0114,{"cveId":78,"description":79,"publishedDate":80,"cvssScore":75,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":81},"CVE-2018-10892","The default OCI linux spec in oci\u002Fdefaults{_linux}.go in Docker\u002FMoby from 1.11 to current does not block \u002Fproc\u002Facpi pathnames. The flaw allows an attacker to modify host's hardware like enabling\u002Fdisabling bluetooth or turning up\u002Fdown keyboard brightness.","2018-07-06",0.01126,{"cveId":83,"description":84,"publishedDate":85,"cvssScore":75,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":86},"CVE-2022-36109","Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container.  This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the `\"USER $USERNAME\"` Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling `ENTRYPOINT [\"su\", \"-\", \"user\"]` the supplementary groups will be set up properly.","2022-09-09",0.01042,{"cveId":88,"description":89,"publishedDate":90,"cvssScore":91,"cvssVersion":37,"severity":46,"isKev":39,"epssScore":92},"CVE-2023-26054","BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. In affected versions when the user sends a build request that contains a Git URL that contains credentials and the build creates a provenance attestation describing that build, these credentials could be visible from the provenance attestation. Git URL can be passed in two ways: 1) Invoking build directly from a URL with credentials. 2) If the client sends additional version control system (VCS) info hint parameters on builds from a local source. Usually, that would mean reading the origin URL from `.git\u002Fconfig` file. When a build is performed under specific conditions where credentials were passed to BuildKit they may be visible to everyone who has access to provenance attestation. Provenance attestations and VCS info hints were added in version v0.11.0. Previous versions are not vulnerable. In v0.10, when building directly from Git URL, the same URL could be visible in `BuildInfo` structure that is a predecessor of Provenance attestations. Previous versions are not vulnerable. This bug has been fixed in v0.11.4. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable VCS info hints by setting `BUILDX_GIT_INFO=0`. `buildctl` does not set VCS hints based on `.git` directory, and values would need to be passed manually with `--opt`.","2023-03-06",6.5,0.01026,[],[95,96,97],{"id":17,"product_name":18,"version_count":19,"cve_count":20,"kev_count":11,"last_cve_update":13},{"id":22,"product_name":23,"version_count":24,"cve_count":25,"kev_count":11,"last_cve_update":26},{"id":28,"product_name":29,"version_count":20,"cve_count":25,"kev_count":11,"last_cve_update":30},{"title":99,"metaDescription":100,"keywords":101,"structuredData":102},"Mobyproject - Security Vulnerabilities & Analysis | Precursor Intelligence","Comprehensive security analysis for Mobyproject covering 3 products with 27 tracked vulnerabilities. Real-time threat intelligence, CVE tracking, and security recommendations.","Mobyproject vulnerabilities, Mobyproject security, Mobyproject CVE, Mobyproject threat intelligence, vendor security analysis, cybersecurity threats, vulnerability management, CVE tracking",{"@context":103,"@type":104,"name":105,"description":100,"url":106},"https:\u002F\u002Fschema.org","Organization","Mobyproject","https:\u002F\u002Fprecursorintelligence.com\u002Fvendors\u002Fmobyproject",{"totalProducts":9,"totalVulnerabilities":10,"kevVulnerabilities":11,"lastUpdated":13,"generatedAt":108,"apiVersion":109},"2026-10-17T10:27:16.489Z","3.0"]